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Abstract
This paper extends Pissarides (1990)’s matching model by considering two sectors (routine and manual)
and workers’ occupational choices, in the context of skill-biased demand shifts, to the detriment of routine
jobs and in favour of manual jobs because of technological changes. The theoretical challenge is to investigate
the reallocation process from the middle towards the bottom of the wage distribution. By using this
framework, we shed light on the way in which labour market institutions affect the job polarization observed
in the United States and Europe. The results of our quantitative experiments suggest that search frictions
have non-trivial effects on the reallocation process and transitional dynamics of aggregate employment.
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1 Introduction
For more than 30 years, developed countries have undergone dramatic structural changes
driven by rapid technological advances. While technological changes increase the marginal
product of skilled workers (skill-biased technological changes hereafter), they affect em-
ployment demand for low-skilled workers in a less trivial way: technological changes gen-
erate skill-biased demand shifts to the detriment of middle-skilled workers and in favour
of the lowest-skilled workers. Technological changes thus lead to job polarization, namely
the disappearance of mid-level jobs (requiring a moderate level of skills, such as autowork-
ers’ jobs) relative to both those at the bottom (requiring few skills such as cleaners and
salespeople) and those at the top (requiring greater skill levels such as managers and pro-
fessionals). Autor & Dorn (2013)1, by using US data , and Goos & Salomons (2014), for
European countries, find empirical evidence of pervasive job polarization. In other words,
the automation of tasks in the middle of the wage distribution (in repetitive, ’routine’
tasks that can be replaced by machines) requires that workers previously employed to
carry out these tasks switch occupations, thereby moving to another labour market where
their manual abilities will be used (e.g. in ’manual’ non-repetitive jobs in the service sec-
tor 2). This paper develops a multi-sectoral search and matching model with endogenous
occupational choice to shed light on the way in which labour market institutions (LMIs)
affect the job polarization observed in the United States and Europe in the context of
skilled-biased technological changes.
Accounting for reallocations from the middle towards the bottom of the wage distribution
has become an important challenge 3. Indeed, these reallocations contrast with those de-
scribed in Aghion & Howitt (1994) and Mortensen & Pissarides (1998) where obsolete jobs
1Jaimovich & Siu (2015) show that this phenomenon is magnified in recession.
2As in Autor & Dorn (2013), the "service sector" herein includes non-routine manual activities in-
volving assisting others (e.g. janitors, cleaners, childcare) performed by unskilled workers.
3Our paper can be viewed as a first step towards developing the following suggestion: "Further work
tractably integrating various forms of labor market imperfections within a framework that incorporates
the endogenous allocation of skills to tasks appears to be another fruitful area for research." Acemoglu &
Autor (2011), p.1160.
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are destroyed and displaced workers are reallocated to jobs on the technological frontier4.
Our work can be viewed as an extension of Mortensen & Pissarides (1999b)’s framework
to a non-stationary environment where workers can move from a declining sector to an
emerging sector. As in Pissarides and Mortensen’s framework, we share the view that
employment allocation across tasks depends on LMIs, unemployment benefits (UB), and
employment protection laws. We also add a focus on the minimum wage (MW). In addi-
tion, our paper relates to research dealing with occupational changes such as Alvarez &
Shimer (2011) and Carrillo-Tudela & Visschers (2014). We borrow from these papers the
distinction between ’search’ and ’rest’ unemployment: a worker in search unemployment
moves to better job opportunities, which is a costly activity, while a worker in rest unem-
ployment waits for her current labour market conditions to improve. While these papers
study career changes over the business cycle, we extend their work by analyzing occu-
pational changes in a non-stationary environment, with structural technological changes.
Workers face long-term changes in productivity across sectors such that workers in routine
jobs know that the labour market conditions cannot improve in the future.
The aim of the present paper is to study employment reallocations from jobs at the middle
of the wage distribution towards low-paid jobs. We then focus on unskilled workers’
sectoral reallocation. We analyze the transitional dynamics from the old world to a new
world, i.e. the path along which structural technological changes remove the competitive
advantages of workers in the middle of the wage distribution, leading them to move to
new opportunities at the bottom of the wage distribution. By nature, this phenomenon
takes time (searching for a job in a new occupation is time consuming), and it can be
blocked if redistributive policies, by increasing the outside option of the poorest, cancel
the potential profits of new jobs in the service sector.
This approach contrasts with the stylized model proposed by Autor & Dorn (2013) who
stress only the long-term effects of the job polarization phenomenon in a frictionless
economy. Workers move from the routine sector to the manual sector without search
frictions as soon as wages are equalized across sectors. Forward-looking behaviours in
occupational choices and sluggish employment adjustments are ignored. For the sake of
simplicity, we consider the basic model of Pissarides (1990), which is suitable for a dynamic
analysis of the job reallocation of unskilled workers. Beyond the comparison of the initial
and final steady states, we also solve the transitional dynamics. Further, our paper goes
4Pissarides & Vallanti (2007) show that technological growth reduces unemployment despite these
reallocations.
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beyond the traditional analysis of LMIs’ effects on labour market outcomes by focusing on
their effects on the reallocation from routine to manual tasks. Our stylized model can be
summarized as follows: (i) there are two sectors (manufacturing and services), with two
opposite exogenous productivity processes (declining for routine jobs and increasing for
manual jobs); (ii) employment allocation is driven by a matching model à la Pissarides
in each segmented market; (iii) as in Autor & Dorn (2013) 5, an individual worker’s
ability affects her productivity in the manufacturing sector, unlike in the service sector;
(iv) each unemployed worker in the routine market chooses the labour market in which
to search for a job; and (v) if she moves from a routine to a manual job, the occupational
change is accompanied by a learning process that transitorily reduces her productivity
on manual tasks (compared with experienced workers in the sector), in accordance with
Cortes (2015)’s empirical finding.
In an unbalanced growth environment with a flexible labour market, we show that (i)
search frictions entice workers to anticipate the changes in productivity across sectors
and (ii) more attractive employment prospects in manual jobs encourage workers to lower
their wage in the first stage of the reallocation process. Indeed, since their decisions rely
on job prospects, which take into account future job finding rates, unemployed workers
can switch occupations before their previous job becomes unprofitable. Workers who
just switched occupations (referred to as ’movers’, or inexperienced/novice workers in
the service sector) can transitorily accept lower wages in manual jobs in anticipation of
future improvements in their productivity as experienced manual workers. Hence, the
first step of job polarization, at least at the individual level, is characterized by lower
wages in the manual sector and longer unemployment spells. Nevertheless, given that
these reallocations are voluntary, each individual moves towards those markets in which
new opportunities are created and thus search unemployment is the best option. We show
that strong downward wage flexibility can accelerate this reallocation process, even if it
involves transitory employment costs.
5With respect to their paper, we focus on unskilled labour only, which is at the heart of the labour
reallocation involved in job polarization. We also develop in this paper a partial equilibrium approach.
Modelling a general equilibrium as in Autor & Dorn (2013) would involve computing the relative price
of services with respect to goods, which depends on relative labour demand and supply in each sector.
This would involve taking into account other elements in the model such as household demand, capital,
skilled workers, and so on, which lies beyond the scope of this paper. This is left for future research. We
also argue that the exogenous rise in service productivity could be considered to be a proxy for the rise
in the relative price of services found in Autor & Dorn (2013).
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Once equilibrium unemployment is explicitly considered, it allows us to take into account
another key dimension of the job reallocation process in interaction with LMIs. We show
that if the unemployment value is not perfectly indexed on labour market conditions
(existence of a MW or UB incorporating a redistributive component), then the reallocation
process can lead to persistent rest unemployment. Indeed, with high wages and strong
downward rigidity, we show that endogenous job separations in the routine sector6 may
occur before the moving market is attractive enough to create jobs. In this case, the
downward rigidity in wages due to high unemployment and the existence of an MW
decreases the aggregate employment rate, at least in the short to medium run and, in some
cases, in the long run. This departure from the frictionless labour market à la Autor &
Dorn (2013) underlines that changes in labour demand (labour shares) within the unskilled
labour market can lead to a large divergence across countries in terms of employment levels
depending on their LMIs. A relatively high level of welfare state incomes can become an
obstacle to employment when polarization is at work. This explains why welfare state
reforms have accompanied the polarization process for more than 20 years. Hence, we
complement the studies of Ljungqvist & Sargent (1998), Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008) and
Hornstein et al. (2007) by providing a framework where the direction of the reallocation
is dictated by the shift in sectoral labour demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2,
before contrasting the US and European cases (Section 3). Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
The structure is based on a search and matching model with endogenous occupational
choice: search, rest and reallocation. It consists of two types of jobs: routine (r) and
manual (s). There is a continuum of workers who differ with respect to their abilities
η. As in Autor & Dorn (2013) , low-skilled workers have homogeneous (heterogeneous)
skills at performing manual (routine) tasks.7 The model endogenously determines which
6Taking into account downward wage rigidity through the existence of a fixed minimum income may
lead to an optimal scrapping time for each task.
7This approach is consistent with the view that blue-collar workers in the factory differ in performing
their tasks on an assembly line while jobs such as janitors can hardly differ in terms of productivity
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workers occupy routine and manual occupations through the endogenous determination
of the η˜ below which workers choose to work in manual jobs in the service sector. The
mobility cost between activities is modelled as a loss of efficiency, which proxies a learning
process on a new occupation 8. Hence, in the production of services, displaced workers
from the routine labour market are novice in service occupations and they thus have lower
productivity than experienced manual workers, which introduces heterogeneity among
workers in the service sector. Occupational choices, by affecting the number of workers
in each unemployment pool, directly alter the unemployment rates in each sector of the
economy as well as job finding probabilities.
Labour markets are characterized by search and matching frictions à la Pissarides (1990).
Search is directed as there is a labour sub-market for each occupation, especially for each
ability level η in routine jobs9. Within each pool, the meeting process between workers
and firms is random. There is no on-the-job search. mt, the amount of hiring per period
in each segment of the labour market (routine for each ability level η and all manual
labour), is determined by a constant returns to scale matching function:
mi = χv
ψ
i u
1−ψ
i , 0 < ψ < 1 (1)
with i = r(η) (routine of ability η), s0(η) (displaced routine worker of ability η who just
switched to a manual job in the service sector), and s (experienced worker in manual
jobs). χ > 0 is a scale parameter measuring the efficiency of the matching function, vi
the number of vacancies and ui the number of unemployed workers. ψ is the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to vacancies. A vacancy is filled with probability
qi = mi/vi and the job finding probability per unit of worker search is fi = mi/ui. Labour
market tightness is vi/ui.
A job can be destroyed for exogenous reasons at rate s. Endogenous separation occurs
when profits become negative. This could arise when the job surplus is negative or when
a MW exists. In all cases, a firing cost d is incurred10.
in providing non-routine manual services. The service sector employs only unskilled labour in non-
routine manual tasks ns (such as janitors, cleaners, etc. occupations involving assisting others). Then,
experimented workers in services are identical. As a result, ability η matters (does not matter) in routine
(manual) productivity.
8For simplicity, we assume that this learning process takes only one period. Obviously, with linear
utility functions, only the size of the efficiency loss matters, not its duration.
9This assumption is also retained in Mortensen & Pissarides (1999c).
10Firing costs are not severance payments but rather the administrative costs of layoff procedures.
Hence, they are pure losses.
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2.2 Bellman equations
2.2.1 Workers
We distinguish three types of unemployed workers: workers of ability η looking for routine
jobs (with subscript r(η)), those looking for manual jobs (with subscript s), and those
previously employed in a routine job but looking for a manual job for inexperienced work-
ers (with subscript s0(η)). In the service sector, we distinguish novice from experienced
workers. New unemployed workers in the service sector (also referred to as novice or
inexperienced) enjoy the same UB as in the routine sector (where they were previously
employed), while experienced unemployed workers with past employment experience in
the service sector enjoy the UB specific to this sector. The present values for unem-
ployed workers in the routine and service sectors (novice and experienced) are denoted
by Ur(η, t), U0s (η, t), and Us(t), respectively. The corresponding employment values are
Wr(η, t), W 0s (η, t), and Ws(t), respectively. Um(η, t) defines the occupational choice of an
unemployed workers between the two sectors. The workers’ value functions reported in
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Figure 1 are
Ur(η, t) = br(η, t) + β[fr(η, t)Wr(η, t+ 1) + (1− fr(η, t))Um(η, t+ 1)] (2)
Um(η, t) = max{Ur(η, t), U0s (η, t)} (3)
U0s (η, t) = br(η, t) + β[f
0
s (η, t)W
0
s (η, t+ 1) + (1− f 0s (η, t))U0s (η, t+ 1)] (4)
Us(t) = bs(t) + β[fs(t)Ws(t+ 1) + (1− fs(t))Us(t+ 1)] (5)
Wr(η, t) = max {wr(η, t) + β[(1− s)Wr(η, t+ 1) + sUm(η, t+ 1)], Um(η, t)} (6)
W 0s (η, t) = max
{
w0s(η, t) + β[(1− s)Ws(t+ 1) + sUs(t+ 1)], U0s (η, t)
}
(7)
Ws(t) = max {ws(t) + β[(1− s)Ws(t+ 1) + sUs(t+ 1)], Us(, t)} (8)
β is the discount factor and s the exogenous separation rate. br(η, t) denotes UB when
unemployed in the routine sector or newly unemployed in the service sector, while unem-
ployed workers with employment experience in the service sector enjoy bs(t). wr(η, t) is
the wage rate in the routine sector as a function of the worker’s ability η. An unemployed
routine worker of ability η at time t (Equation (2)), with value Ur(η, t), can find a job with
probability fr(η, t). If the worker fails to find a job, he can decide to switch occupations,
in which case, we refer to him as a "mover". This happens if the expected value from
unemployment in the service sector is larger than that in the routine sector. Equation
(3) captures the occupational choice. In the service sector, the wage rates are w0s(η, t)
and ws(t) for novice and experienced workers respectively. Unemployed workers find a
job with probabilities f 0s (η, t) and fs(t). Employed workers may become unemployed at
rate s. It should be noted that unemployed workers in the service sector do not have an
occupational choice.
Concerning mobility choices, they appear twice: unemployed workers can choose in which
market they will search (Equation (3)), and employed workers can choose to quit because
firms cannot keep up with the rise in their outside options (Equation (6)). Endogenous
separations can occur when U0s (η, t) = max{Wr(η, t), Um(η, t)}. As a result, in Equation
(2), the unemployment value Um(η, t + 1) = U0s (η, t) is not indexed on the employment
value Wr.
2.2.2 Firms
The continuum of producers in a competitive market use labour as their only input. A job
may be either filled and productive or unfilled and unproductive. The values of a filled
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job in the routine and service sectors (novice and experienced) are denoted as Jr(η, t),
J0s (η, t), and Js(t), respectively. The associated values when the job is vacant are Vr(η, t),
V 0s (η, t), and Vs(t), respectively
Jr(η, t) = yr(t)η − wr(η, t) + β [(1− s) max {Jr(η, t+ 1),−d}+ sVr(η, t)] (9)
J0s (η, t) = δys(t)− w0s(η, t) + β [(1− s) max {Js(t+ 1),−d}+ sVs(t)] (10)
Js(t) = ys(t)− ws(t) + β [(1− s) max {Js(t+ 1),−d}+ sVs(t)] (11)
Vr(η, t) = −κ+ β[qr(η, t)Jr(η, t+ 1) + (1− qr(η, t))Vr(η, t+ 1)] (12)
V 0s (η, t) = −κ+ β[q0s(η, t)(1− s)J0s (η, t+ 1) + (1− q0s(η, t))V 0s (η, t+ 1)] (13)
Vs(t) = −κ+ β[qs(t)(1− s)Js(t+ 1) + (1− qs(t))Vs(t+ 1)] (14)
Productivity in a routine job is characterized by two components: yr(t) is a common
component and η is the ex-ante skill ability. ys(t) denotes the productivity of a manual
job. yr(t) and ys(t) are both exogenously determined. The productivity of novice workers
in the service sector is assumed to be lower than that of experienced workers, i.e. δ ≤ 1. To
fill their vacant jobs, firms publish adverts and screen workers, incurring hiring costs κ. A
vacant job is filled with probability qi. Finally, routine jobs may shut down endogenously
when profits are negative or, if dismissal costs exist (d), when the firm’s profits are lower
than dismissal costs. In this case, it is better to terminate employment and pay dismissal
costs. 12
Job creation is driven by the free entry condition. In equilibrium, all gain opportunities
generated by a vacant job are equal to zero, i.e. Vi = 0. From Equations (12) - (14), one
gets:
κ
qi(t)
= βJi(t+ 1) i = r(η), s
0(η), s (15)
12Given the exogenous productivity change considered herein, once created, manual jobs are always
profitable. Endogenous separation does not occur for manual jobs in the service sector. Endogenous
separations affect routine employment.
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2.2.3 Wages and unemployment benefits
Wages. Wages are determined through an individual Nash bargaining process. The
optimal sharing rule leads to13
ξJi(t) = (1− ξ)(Wi(t)− Ui(t)) (16)
where ξ and 1 − ξ denote the bargaining power of firms and workers, respectively. The
indexation of the unemployment value to the worker or firm values rules out endogenous
separations. This is the case when unemployed workers do not choose to change occupa-
tions. By contrast, when they choose to change occupations, employees’ outside options
become the search value in another labour market, a value not indexed on the job value
of the market in which they are employed. If this new unemployment value (the value of
the inexperienced unemployed worker in the service sector) remains constant or increases,
whereas worker and firm values decrease because of the fall in productivity (as is the
case for routine jobs), then the outside option can become the best option after a finite
employment spell. Hence, outsiders’ occupational change places upward pressure on the
routine wage of ’insiders’ by introducing a credible alternative that comes from another
market. If this outside option leads to a wage that will be outside the bargaining set, then
there is a separation. This defines an optimal quitting rule given by Wi(T̂ )− Ui(T̂ ) = 0,
where Wi(T̂ ) is the employment value for a wage that corresponds to the solution of the
Nash bargaining process.14 Before this finite endogenous employment spell, if it exists,
wages are given by15:
w˜r(η, t) = ξ(yr(t)η + κθr(η, t)) + (1− ξ)br(η, t) if Ur(η, t) > U0s (η, t) (17)
w˜r(η, t) = ξ(yr(t)η + κθ
0
s(η, t)) + (1− ξ)br(η, t) if Ur(η, t) ≤ U0s (η, t) (18)
w˜0s(η, t) = ξ(δys(t) + κθ
0
s(η, t)) + (1− ξ)(br(η, t) + β(U0s (η, t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1)))(19)
w˜s(t) = ξ(ys(t) + κθs(t)) + (1− ξ)bs(t) (20)
13Following Ljungqvist (1999), we assume that the Nash product is Ji(t)ξ(Wi(t)−Ui(t))1−ξ each period
t, instead of Ji(t)ξ(Wi(t)− Ui(t))1−ξ at the time of the meeting and (Ji(t) + d)ξ(Wi(t)− Ui(t))1−ξ after
the meeting. Indeed, Ljungqvist (1999) shows that these alternative wage structures only change the
wage over the career, but not the employment allocation. Hence, we adopt the simplest contract.
14When the outside options can lead the employee to quit, she can ask for a wage that corresponds to
her productivity: this case corresponds to the solution of an ultimatum. However, in this case, the firm
closes down, and thus the match is also broken. Hence, if we take into account the possibility of this
ultimatum, this does not change the employment relationship, only the terminology of the separation: it
becomes a "scrap" instead of a "quit".
15Wages are reported in Appendix A.
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In Equation (17), all components are indexed on the decreasing productivity of routine
jobs yr(t). This is not the case in (18), where θ0s(η, t) depends on increasing productiv-
ity in the service sector ys(t). The outside option given by an alternative market with
increasing productivity can push the wage outside the bargaining set, leading to endoge-
nous separations. How are these outside options perceived by workers? If workers choose
to switch occupations, then they target the jobs of experienced employees in the ser-
vice sector. They accept lowering their reservation wages by an amount proportional to
β(U0s (η, t+ 1)−Us(t+ 1)) (Equation (19)) to access more easily the learning process, the
prerequisite of being an experienced worker. These low-bargained wages on the first job
of movers raise labour market tightness (θ0s(η, t)) and thus the bargained wage paid for
routine jobs (Equation (18)).
Minimum wage. LMIs can distort this bargained wage. First, if there is a MW, the
wage is:
wi = max(w˜i(t), wmin(t)) (21)
If the MW is binding, then the firm has the right to manage. For jobs where the marginal
returns are decreasing (routine jobs), it is possible to determine an optimal scrapping time
that is not mutually advantageous i.e. Jr(η, t)− d ≤ 0, whereas Wr(η, t)− Um(η, t) ≥ 0,
where the optimal scrapping rule is Jr(η, T ?)− d = 0. In addition, the MW can block the
creation of service jobs if the labour cost of an inexperienced worker exceeds its marginal
return, i.e. δys(t) ≤ wmin where δys(T˜ ) = wmin is the opening rule for movers.
Unemployment benefits. We consider two types of UB. The first stresses the insur-
ance motive in UB with an indexation of UB on current individual wages. The second
one emphasizes redistribution. UB are set according to the following rules:
A benefit system purely based the insurance motive ("UB indexed"):
br(η, t) = ρwr(η, t) (22)
bs(t) = ρws(t) (23)
A benefit system with a redistributive component ("UB not-indexed"):
br(η, t) = ρ(t)wr(η, 0) (24)
bs(t) = ρ(t)ws(0) (25)
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In Equations (22) and (23), the replacement rate ρ is fixed. Hence, along the technological
transition, the gap between UB and wages remains constant. UB are indexed on wage
changes. In Equations (24) and (25), UB are based on wages at the beginning of the
technological changes wr(η, 0) and ws(0). The polarization process involves displacement
of routine workers and employment growth in the service sector. With rules such as in
Equations (24) and (25), UB remain generous for routine workers (who lose their jobs
during the transition), while they are less generous for workers in the service sector (who
are the winners of the technological changes). To that extent, Equations (24) and (25)
have a distributive content. Finally, Equations (24) and (25) disconnect UB from wage
growth along the technological transition. The non-indexation of UB to the sectoral
marginal return can lead to endogenous separations in routine jobs, while it can block the
opening of new jobs for inexperienced workers in manual jobs (whose UB are also based
on br). Finally, we also allow ρ(t) to vary over time.
2.3 Stocks and flows
We assume that the mass of employed and unemployed workers is fixed and equal to one.
To simplify the notations, we consider the following variables:
Im(η, t) =
{
1 if Ur(η, t) ≤ U0s (η, t)
0 otherwise
Is(η, t) =
{
1 if Jr(η, t) ≤ −d
0 otherwise
Iq(η, t) =
{
1 if Wr(η, t) ≤ Um(η, t)
0 otherwise
where Im(η, t) is an indicator function defining whether the routine worker moves to the
service sector. Is(η, t) and Iq(η, t) correspond to indicator functions describing whether
the match is dissolved from the initiative of the firm alone or from a mutual agreement,
respectively. Without any real wage rigidities (no MW and UB indexed on wages), we
always have Is(η, t) = Iq(η, t) = 0, ∀η, t. By contrast, the MW can lead to Is(η, t) = 1 but
Iq(η, t) = 0, whereas non-indexed UB can lead to Is(η, t) = Iq(η, t) = 1.
Property 1. The existence of constant real wage rigidity (MW or UB constant over
time) is a sufficient condition to have endogenous destructions among routine jobs, i.e.
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Is(η, t) = 1 or Is(η, t) = Iq(η, t) = 1. Over time, the rise in the marginal returns of a
job in the service sector allows the economy to generate reallocations, i.e. Im(η, t) = 1.
The existence of increasing real wage rigidities (MW or UB increasing over time) is a
sufficient condition to block the reallocation process, i.e. Im(η, t) = 0, ∀η, t, even if there
are endogenous separations, Is(η, t) = 1 or Is(η, t) = Iq(η, t) = 1.
Tightness is:
θr(η, t) =
{
Equations (9) and (15) if Im(η, t) = 0 & Is(η, t) = 0 & Iq(η, t) = 0
0 otherwise
Given the decision rules of firms and workers, employment in period t + 1 has two com-
ponents: novice and experienced workers. New employment relationships are formed
through the matching process. Matches formed in period t contribute to period t employ-
ment. At the beginning of period t+ 1, ni(t)(1− s) jobs are inherited from the previous
period. The laws of motion on the labour market of routine jobs are as follows:
nr(η, t+ 1) =
[
nr(η, t)(1− s) + ur(η, t)fr(η, t)
]
(1− Is(η, t+ 1))(1− Iq(η, t+ 1))(26)
ur(η, t+ 1) =
[
ur(η, t)(1− fr(η, t)) + snr(η, t)(1− Is(η, t+ 1))(1− Iq(η, t+ 1))
+nr(η, t) max(Is(η, t+ 1), Iq(η, t+ 1))
]
(1− Im(η, t+ 1)) (27)
where nr(η) and ur(η) denote the number of employed and unemployed workers in the
routine sector, respectively. The employment dynamics in each labour market are more
complex than those in the basic Pissarides (1990) model. Before the structural change,
we have Is(η, t+ 1) = Iq(η, t+ 1) = 0: Equation (26) is the same as in the basic Pissarides
(1990) model with exogenous separations. In this case, the market remains segmented if
Im(η, t+ 1) = 0, and unemployment dynamics are also the same as in the basic Pissarides
(1990) model with exogenous separations (Equation (27)). However, during the structural
change, there are reallocations. Hence, even if there is no endogenous separation (scrap-
ping or quit) at time t, i.e. Iq(η, t + 1) = Iq(η, t + 1) = 0, unemployed routine workers
can move to the more attractive market of manual jobs Im(η, t+ 1) = 1. In this case, no
unemployed workers are in the segment of η-type workers, and employment declines at
the rate of the exogenous separation . Finally, whatever the reason for the separation, the
jobs disappear and workers become unemployed, leading them to choose between search
and rest unemployment (to move or not to move to a new occupation). The opportunity
to switch occupations gives rise to a new market: that of inexperienced workers carrying
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out manual tasks. The laws of motion in this labour market are as follows:
u0s(η, t+ 1) = u
0
s(η, t)(1− f 0s (η, t)) + ur(η, t)Im(η, t+ 1)
+nr(η, t) max(Is(η, t+ 1), Iq(η, t+ 1))Im(η, t+ 1) (28)
ns(η, t) = u
0
s(η, t)f
0
s (η, t) (29)
where u0s(η) and n0s(η) denote the number of newly unemployed and employed workers
in the service sector, respectively. Equation (28) shows that this market exists only if
there are some entries, of an amount ur(η, t) + nr(η, t) max(Is(η, t + 1), Iq(η, t + 1)) if
routine unemployed workers choose to move to manual occupations, i.e. Im(η, t+ 1) = 1.
Thus, these new entries are larger when there are endogenous separations (i.e. when
Is(η, t+ 1) = 1 and/or when Iq(η, t+ 1) = 1). Equation (29) defines the transitional stock
of inexperienced workers on manual tasks, who have learned their jobs after one quarter.
The laws of motion in the labour market of experienced manual workers are as follows:
us(t+ 1) = us(t)(1− fs(t)) + s(ns(t) +
∑
η
n0s(η, t)) (30)
ns(t) = 1− us(t)−
∑
η
ur(η, t)−
∑
η
nr(η, t) (31)
where us and ns denote the number of unemployed and employed experienced workers,
respectively. The stock of unemployed workers in the service sector falls with hirings
and increases with separations and the number of workers who change occupations. The
latter includes workers already unemployed who decide to move to the service sector and
employed workers experiencing endogenous job destructions who choose to switch directly
to the service sector. Finally, because of the unit mass of the labour force, employment in
the service sector, in Equation (31), is pinned down by subtracting all other stocks from
the unit mass of the labour force.
Property 2. The model displays two potential types of unemployment in the routine
sector:
• Search unemployment if Im(η) = 1 and ∀Is(η).
• Rest unemployment if Im(η) = 0 and ∀Is(η), Iq(η).
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3 Reallocations and employment dynamics
This section analyzes the transitory impact of technological bias à la Autor & Dorn (2013)
on the reallocation process. The analytical comparison of steady states is insufficient
because the jobs occupied by workers who learn their new tasks do not necessarily exist at
the steady state. This leads us to solve the transitional dynamics of the model numerically.
We do not propose a calibration exercise based on empirical targets in particular countries,
but a numerical exercise allowing us to disentangle the main mechanisms at work in a
reallocation process at the bottom of the wage distribution. Hence, all the structural
parameters are maintained constant over all the simulations, while the LMI parameters
can vary over time. By doing so, we isolate the impact of the structural change for different
LMIs. Our benchmark case is a flexible economy: there is no MW, UB are low and indexed
on previous wages, and dismissal costs are nil (an economy reminiscent of that in the
United States). By contrast, we consider two types of European economies characterized
by several labour market rigidities in order to contain income inequalities. By nature,
redistribution introduces some incomes that are not indexed on labour marginal returns
in a specific firm. Hence, when productivity growth is unbalanced across sectors, these
policies can weaken those that decline or prevent the creation of new jobs for novice
workers. Two models have emerged since the end of WWII in Europe. The first relies
on generous social programmes and UB as powerful redistributive tools (referred to as
Nordic Europe) and the second has an MW set by the state (referred to as Continental
Europe). If these two models introduce strong downward real wage rigidities, they are also
characterized by the existence of dismissal costs: these are low when the social programmes
are generous, but high where the MW is high. We show that these two types of European
economies do not share the same properties even though their LMIs could lead to the same
deadlocks: the tools aiming at containing inequalities may actually block the reallocation
process. As underlined by Ljungqvist & Sargent (1998) and Ljungqvist & Sargent (2008),
in tranquil times, namely when transitions between homogeneous jobs are costless, the
European system can be viewed as a good arbitration between economic performance and
inequality. We point out that this claim no longer holds true in turbulent times, namely
in periods when reallocation is costly (human capital losses and learning periods). With
respect to these papers, we focus on the reallocation process across sectors16.
16From this point of view, we also depart from Hornstein et al. (2007) who focus on how labour demand
responses depend on LMIs in the context of rapid technological changes, without any identification of the
direction of the structural change.
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3.1 Calibration
We assume quarterly frequencies and consider three types of calibrations: (i) a flexible
labour market (as in the United States), (ii) a rigid labour market (as in Continental
Europe), and (iii) a stylized Nordic labour market.
Common parameters. We set the discount factor to 0.99, which gives an annual real
rate of 4%. Following Mortensen & Pissarides (1999a), we impose the Hosios condition
ξ = 1 − ψ (workers’ bargaining power is equal to the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to unemployment). By using the information provided by Petrongolo &
Pissarides (2001), the elasticity of the matching function is set to 0.5. We assume that
the cost of posting a vacancy is 0.15, implying a ratio of vacancy cost over productivity
of 6% in the flexible economy. For the separation rate, we set an intermediate value
between the highest inflow rate into unemployment and it lowest values estimated by
Elsby et al. (2013): s = 0.07. Concerning matching efficiency, OECD statistics show that
the average unemployment duration is about 5.7 months in the United States and 14.3
months in France over the same period; therefore, χ is set to match the intermediate
value of 9.5 months. The aggregate component of routine productivity yr is normalized
to 1. The initial productivity value in services is set to match the initial share of routine
jobs in the United States, which is about 60% (OECD and Albertini et al. (2015))17. The
productivity loss incurred by newly displaced routine workers who just start working in
manual jobs is captured by δ in Equation (10). This value is chosen to mimic the range of
wage losses after changing from the routine to the service sector, as estimated by Cortes
(2015) using US data.
Country-specific parameters. The LMIs are : the binding MW, the replacement rate,
and dismissal costs. For the MW, we take the "French case" as a representative target.18
Two measures summarize the importance of the MW: (1) the proportion of workers at
the MW which which is around 14.5%, and (2) the Kaitz index (ratio of MW over gross
full-time mean earnings) of about 55% according to the OECD. However, these statistics
take into account skilled and unskilled workers. Given that the model accounts only for
unskilled workers, we recompute these two statistics over unskilled workers and obtain a
17This choice implies that the share of routine jobs among low-skilled jobs is 90%. We prefer to keep
ys the same in the two economies and argue that this stylized calibration may correspond to a case where
job polarization arrives later in France.
18As discussed below, the group of European countries with a national MW is not restricted to France.
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Variables Symbol Value Source
Discount factor β 0.99 4% annual real rate
Vacancy posting costs κ 0.15 Target κv ' 0.06y
Matching frictions ψ 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
Worker bargaining power ξ 0.5 Hosios imposed
Matching efficiency χ 0.3 Employment rate = 90%
Separation rate s 0.06 Elsby et al. (2013)
Routine aggregate productivity yr 1 Normalization
Service aggregate productivity ys 0.71 Albertini et al. (2015)
Productivity loss δ 0.9 Cortes (2015)
Table 1: Common Parameters for the United States and Europe.
proportion of workers at the MW of 20% and a Kaitz index of 86%. wmin = 0.7 matches
these targets. According to the OECD, the average net replacement rates over 60 months
of unemployment for families that qualify for cash housing and social assistance19 (overall
average over family status) are given in Table 2. We divide European countries into two
groups: "Continental Europe" is the group of countries where there is a national MW in
2004,20 whereas, there is no national MW in 2004 in "Nordic Europe"21. The UB rules in
Continental Europe are given by Equations (22)-(23), whereas in Nordic Europe, they are
given by Equations (24)-(25). The rationale for this choice is based on the comparison of
replacement rates for families who qualify for cash housing and social assistance and those
who do not. Based on OECD data, in Nordic countries, the replacement rate for families
who qualify for cash housing and social assistance is 22 points higher than that for families
who do not. By contrast, the gap in replacement ratios falls to 10 points for countries
in Continental Europe. This fact suggests that, in Nordic Europe, unemployment is a
strong marker for redistribution, which is not the case for Continental Europe. In the
benchmark calibration, replacement ratios for Nordic Europe are constant in Equations
(24)-(25). The values are given in Table 2.
The distinction between Continental and Nordic Europe is also based on dismissal costs.
Table 2 shows that the OECD summary indicator of the stringency of employment pro-
19We look at this statistic because we want to account for social programmes targeted at inactive
workers.
20For these countries, the monthly MW as a proportion of average monthly earnings is 47.3% in
Belgium, 46.5% in France, 44.2% in Portugal, and 37.6% in Spain (Source Eurostat).
21Thus, for these countries, Eurostat cannot provide any information on a Kaitz index based on a
national MW.
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US Continental Europe Nordic Europe
Bel Fra Prt Spa Den Fin Ger Swe
OECD replacement rates (2004) 0.31 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.49 0.84 0.74 0.66 0.74
OECD employment protection (2003) 0.2 2.2 3 3.7 3.1 1.4 2 2.3 2.2
ρ: calibrated value 0.3 0.6 0.75
d: calibrated value 0 1.7 0
Table 2: Replacement rates and dismissal costs.
tection legislation is larger in Continental Europe than in Nordic Europe. In our stylized
representation of LMIs, we simplify in the following way: only Continental Europe has
dismissal costs, while the other countries (the United States and Nordic Europe) do not.
Dismissal costs correspond to the costs associated with layoff procedures as well as le-
gal and administrative costs. By using French administrative data, Abowd & Kramarz
(2003) estimate that the cost of employment protection legislation is about one sixth of
the annual wage in France. We then set d = 1.7 such that d/w¯ = 2 on a quarterly basis,
where w¯ is the average wage.22
Technological structural change and workers’ ability distribution. The struc-
tural change is captured by a decline in the productivity of routine jobs by 10% and, at
the same time, an increase in the productivity of manual jobs by 10%. For simplicity, we
consider a linear adjustment of the shock of 50 periods (12 years). The shocks are unan-
ticipated. However, following the economic disturbances, agents have perfect foresight
over future trajectories and know the terminal conditions. Our objective is to compute
the transitional dynamics between the initial and final steady states. In addition, we
assume that ability η follows a Uniform distribution with support U(0.6; 1). We consider
10 ability levels between 0.6 and 1. The quantitative impact of technological trends on
job polarization also depend on the ability distribution, as the latter determines the mass
of workers in each ability level that is affected by scrapping, quit and occupational switch.
These values, while arbitrary, mimic the direction of the structural change discussed by
Autor & Dorn (2013). The paper is a first step towards the understanding of job polariza-
tion in a search and matching setting. The paper offers a first illustration of the economic
mechanisms at work.
The calibration is such that occupational change is unprofitable for workers in the routine
22Mortensen & Pissarides (1999a) estimate this cost to be about three times as large as the cost of
keeping an open vacancy.
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sector at the initial steady state. This strategy allows us to evaluate the role of LMIs on
the propagation of the structural change. Furthermore, the shocks are likely to impact the
binding of the MW, occupational choices, quits, and plant shutdowns. Therefore, solving
the model involves dealing with a non-stationary non-linear environment to capture struc-
tural changes in the economy. Standard solution methods that approximate the dynamics
around a unique steady state are not implementable here. We thus use the block-recursive
property of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model to solve the paths of the forward
variables independent of the block that governs the dynamics of the backward variables.
An overview of the algorithm is described in B.
3.2 The US case
The structural change modifies occupational choices: (i) unemployed workers can choose
to move into more valuable markets, (ii) workers can choose to quit their firms, (iii)
manufacturing firms can decide to scrap obsolete jobs, or (iv) services firm can choose to
open new positions.
Panel c. of Figure 3 displays the value functions of unemployed workers in routine and
manual jobs at the beginning and the end of the technological changes. At the initial
steady state, all workers with η ≥ η(4) are such that their unemployment value in the
routine sector is larger than that in the service sector. These workers are located in the
routine sector, while low type workers, with η ≤ η(3), are employed in manual jobs.
In the final steady state, all workers with η ≤ η(7) are employed in the service sector.
This means that four types of workers choose to switch occupations during the structural
change, i.e. 40% of the workers are displaced during the structural change. Panels d. and
e. of Figure 3 show that workers employed in routine jobs (η > η(7)) do not voluntarily
quit and are employed in firms where it is not optimal to scrap jobs: the structural change
does not lead to suboptimal separations. Panel f. of Figure 3 shows that these choices
to move into manual jobs are supported by positive profits for the firms that hire these
inexperienced workers, ∀η. The indexation of UB on the previous wage makes profits a
decreasing function of ability η. Indeed, while a higher worker’s ability gives more UB,
ability does not change productivity in manual tasks, resulting in a decrease in profits.
For the initial steady state, i.e. before the structural change, panel a. of Figure 3 shows
that tightness in the service sector is larger than that in routine jobs for η ≤ η(3).
This finding is consistent with the occupational choices summarized in panel c. Further,
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d.e.f.quitting,scrappingandopeningrulesasexplainedinSection2.2.3.
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the downward sloping shape of profits for movers (panel f.) reduces their tightness as
ability level increases (panel a.) while tightness for experienced manual workers remains
independent of ability level (in panel a. flat dashed lines). This figure also shows that the
structural change shifts the curve of labour market tightness for routine θR (manual θS)
jobs downward (upward). The sharp increase in θS compensates for the negative response
of θR resulting from the structural change. In the United States, market adjustments
through changes in θ, provide strong signals for low-to- middle-ability routine workers to
switch occupations. Unemployed workers in the routine sector with high abilities enjoy
generous UB, which deters them from changing occupations and accessing service jobs.
Furthermore, as shown by panel b., the bargained wages for movers are low because these
individuals accept a reduction in their reservation wage today to enjoy better market
conditions once experienced in the service sector. This fact explains why the labour market
tightness in these jobs is the highest until η = η(7). The implied low unemployment
duration and expectation of career progression, are then able to attract new workers, from
η = η(3) to η = η(7), despite the losses in instantaneous wages. These wage losses are
reported in panel b. of Figure 3: they range from 3% to 10%. This finding is consistent
with the range of wage losses after changing from routine to service occupations, as
estimated by Cortes (2015) using US data. The Nash bargaining rule leads to enough wage
flexibility to allow for wage cuts. These wage cuts prevent endogenous job destructions
and create new jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The results of these workforce movements on (un)employment stocks are reported in Fig-
ure 4: the aggregate dynamics of (un)employment in routine and manual jobs are displayed
on the right (panels c. and f.), whereas the dynamics per worker-ability η are reported in
panels a. b. d. and e. Two important features, linked to the intertemporal nature of the
Pissarides model, must be noted. First, for the labour market directed to workers that
will decide to move, the decline in routine employment is sluggish: in panel a. of Figure
4, stocks fall as workers switch occupation to manual jobs (η ∈ {η(4), η(5), η(6), η(7)}).
As only unemployed workers can switch occupations, in the absence of binding scrapping
times, the pace of occupational changes is given by the exogenous separation rate s. The
extinction of old activities takes time. This does not imply a large increase in unemploy-
ment in these labour markets. Panel b. of Figure 4 shows that, for each η-type worker,
for η ∈ {η(4), η(5), η(6), η(7)}, the number of unemployed workers searching for a routine
job, falls instantaneously to zero. The immediate counterpart of this workforce movement
is a jump in the number of unemployed workers searching for a manual job (panel d. of
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Figure 4): "search unemployment" increases during the structural change. Second, the
forward behaviours of unemployed workers lead them to move before a decline in the job
finding probability in the labour markets of routine tasks. Hence, when productivity in
the service sector rises, a proportion of newly created jobs in the service sector is already
matched. In the United States where the job filling rate if fairly high, the arrival of newly
unemployed workers in the service sector is absorbed very quickly (panel f. of Figure 4).
Panel e. of Figure 4 shows that the stock of movers briefly remains in this state. Indeed,
these stocks are 0 at the beginning and at the end of the technological changes. If 40%
of the workforce moves towards services through "bridge" jobs (jobs for novice workers in
the service sector), the stock of these low-paid jobs is small because the duration of the
learning process is short, as workers rapidly gain experience in manual tasks.
3.3 The European cases
In the same context, we show that the existence of a MW/high UB can block the reallo-
cation process by making these jobs unprofitable.
3.3.1 Continental Europe
We distinguish several cases depending on the evolution of the MW along the transition
path.
Constant MW along the transition path. Panel a. of Figure 5 shows the impor-
tance of labour costs in countries characterized by a high MW. For η ≤ η(4), the MW is
binding for routine jobs (panel b. of Figure 5). Before the structural change, workers of
type η ≤ η(3) cannot be employed in routine jobs because their labour costs are higher
than their productivities, leading to zero labour market tightness and thus no hirings
(Panel a. of Figure 5). Panel f. of Figure 5 indicates that workers of type η ≤ η(3)
cannot be employed in the labour market of inexperienced workers in manual jobs ei-
ther. The opening rule is not satisfied because inexperienced workers cost more than
they produce. Given that the initial condition is exogenous, if any η-type workers, with
η ≤ η(3), had been oriented towards routine jobs, after leaving education, they would
have remained unemployed until the beginning of the structural changes since the jobs
of inexperienced manual workers, incorporating a learning process, are not open before
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period 0. Therefore, workers with η ≤ η(3) are in an unemployment trap before the be-
ginning of the technological change. With the structural change, the set of opportunities
changes. Panel c. of Figure 5 shows that the best option is to move from routine jobs to
new manual jobs for η ≤ η(5). However, given that η-type workers with η ≤ η(3) were
not previously in routine jobs, only workers of type η = {η(4), η(5)} switch occupations
during the transition, i.e. 20% of the population. Panel f. of Figure 5 shows that these
mobility choices allow workers to meet job openings for inexperienced displaced workers.
These jobs, now profitable thanks to the structural change, lead to hirings and thus
labour market tightness becomes greater than zero (panel a. of Figure 5). Because of
the existence of a MW, bridge jobs from routine markets to services are scarce. In this
first stylized European labour market, a slight increase in the MW during the structural
change can lead to an equilibrium without reallocations, i.e. an unemployment trap/rest
unemployment. Equilibrium labour market tightness is equal to zero for movers before
and after the structural change. Given this absence of opportunities to move to other jobs,
all workers remain rest unemployed in their routine labour markets. The benefit of these
LMIs is that wage inequalities could be contained. Finally, an additional cost of the MW
is the potential existence of endogenous job destructions, but these are prevented here
thanks to dismissal costs. Indeed, without dismissal costs, the "scrapping rules" exclude
some workers from routine tasks. The combination of unproductive jobs and a high MW
leads to an unprofitable employment relationship for the firm. With the decline in the
productivity of routine jobs, this selection process is at work.
How does the structural change modify the allocation of employment across markets?
Panel a. of Figure 6 shows that the lowest-skilled workers η are not employed before the
structural change and can only follow the rest unemployment option (the top red line
in panel b. of Figure 6). For η ∈ {η(2), η(3)}, the structural change is not really good
news: during the first 45 quarters, there are no job openings in the labour markets of their
η-specific tasks and the jobs allowing them to begin a new career in the service sector
are not yet open. At the pace of the exogenous separation s, the employment rate of
these η-type workers declines, whereas their unemployment rates continuously increase.
At the aggregate level (panel f. of Figure 6), this phenomenon leads to an increase
in inequalities among unskilled workers. The chance of being unemployed increases for
routine workers, whereas it declines for those searching for a job in the service sector.
During 12 years, the inequality of access to jobs increases because the high MW prevents
job creation at the bottom of the wage distribution, thereby shutting down the reallocation
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process. After 12 years (more than 45 quarters), the increase in marginal returns in
the service sector allows new jobs to compensate for the high MW. Therefore, some
bridge jobs can be created, giving new opportunities to the unemployed workers trapped
in rest unemployment (panels b. and d. of Figure 6). In panel b., we see that the
stock of the unemployed workers ur(η) falls sharply to zero and becomes the new initial
stock of the unemployed moving into the service sector (u0s(η)). η-type workers, for
η ∈ {η(1), η(2), η(3)}, take advantage of this opportunity, and move into jobs in the service
sector. However, given that the duration of the structural change lasts 50 quarters, the
marginal return goes beyond the constraint of the MW, but only by a small gap. Further,
the capitalized profits in the jobs directed to inexperienced workers are small, leading
to few vacancies in this labour market. The number of unemployed workers thus rises
dramatically, leading to a strongly persistent reallocation process. After 50 years, the
path of aggregate employment is not fully stabilized (panels d. and e. of Figure 6). At
the sectoral level, panels c. and f. show the two regimes characterizing the structural
change. In the first step (the first 12 years), there are employment losses in routine jobs
accompanied by small gains in the service sector and no reallocations (unemployment
continuously increases). In the second step, and only at the end of the structural change
(no more gains can be expected), a small set of bridge jobs opens, allowing for a gradual
reduction in unemployment in the services sector.
Increasing MW along the transition path. According to Eurostat data, the MW
in Continental Europe has increased over the recent decades. This case is thus more
realistic from our point of view. The MW goes up by 2.8% in a linear fashion during the
technological transition.
Figure 7 suggests that the gradual employment reallocation described in the last para-
graph stops when the MW increases along with technological changes. The economy
remains segmented and the chances of being employed decrease in the routine labour
market, with the lowest-skilled workers at greatest risk. The corollary is an increase in
the number of unemployed workers, who are then in permanent rest unemployment.
3.3.2 Nordic Europe
Concerning the initial steady state, Figure 8 shows that Nordic Europe looks like Conti-
nental Europe (Figure 5). Only η-type of workers with η > η(3) can work in routine jobs,
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withtheremainderemployedintheservicesector.Inpanelc.,attheinitialsteadystate,
unemploymentvalueisgreaterinroutinejobsforη>η(3)
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What about the dynamics in Nordic Europe? Even if the speed of the reallocation process
is larger than that in Continental Europe (33% vs 20%), after 50 quarters, the process is
finished (panels e. and d. of Figure 9). Another important difference lies in the absence of
"rest unemployment" (panel b. of Figure 9). Despite generous unemployment insurance,
bridge jobs are still being created at the beginning of structural changes. Further, as in the
US economy, labour reallocations occur across sectors at the beginning of the structural
change (panels c. and f. of Figure 9). Panel a. of Figure 9 shows that the scrapping
of routine jobs is effective 45 quarters after the beginning of the structural change, when
workers of type η = η(4) are fired. These workers choose to search for manual jobs (as
captured by the fourth peak of u0r(η) in panel e), which leads to new hires (panel d. of
Figure 9). Interestingly, Figure 8 suggests that, at the initial and final steady states,
routine jobs for η = η(5) are profitable (panel e.). This is also the case for "the bridge
jobs" of inexperienced manual workers (panel f.). However, along the transition, routine
workers with η = η(5) decide to quit their jobs (panel d.). The quitting rule binds along
the transition, giving rise to the fourth peak in panel e. of Figure 9. In a nutshell, the
comparison of panel c. of Figures 4 and 9 illustrates how the level of UB influences the
composition of employment at the end of the structural changes. The dominant effect is
a reduction in the size of the sector that trains inexperienced manual workers, thereby
reducing the share of manual workers in unskilled workers.
3.4 Comparing employment performances
What do we learn at the macroeconomic level from these microeconomic labour market
decisions? To clarify the comparison of the results, we summarize the dynamics of ag-
gregate employment in two figures. Figure 10 reports the US and Nordic Europe cases,
while Figure 11 displays the cases for Continental Europe. To control for the basic ef-
fects of heterogeneous LMIs on the employment rate, we report the transition paths after
normalizing to 100 the initial level of employment (before the structural change).
Figure 10 suggests that the performances of the United States and Nordic Europe are
close. A surprising result is that during the reallocation process, search unemployment
induces a fall (rise) in aggregate unemployment (employment). The short-term transitory
employment gains come from the wage flexibility that eases the reallocation. Indeed,
workers who left routine jobs enjoy the prospect of becoming an experienced manual
worker. During the wage bargaining process, they accept lower wages to access the learn-
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Figure 10: Aggregate employment rate in the United States and Nordic
Europe. a. US economy, UB given by Equations (22)-(23). b. Nordic case, constant replace-
ment ratios ρ in Equations (24)-(25). c. replacement ratios ρ(t) linearly increase by 10% along
the technological transition in Equations (24)-(25).
ing process and become experienced manual workers thereafter. This behaviour simply
reflects the firm’s interest in capturing a part of the worker’s future rent, leading to a
transitional decrease in labour costs and an increase in employment. This phenomenon
can explain the rise in aggregate employment observed in the United States from 1985
to 2005. Note that the firm’s greater ability to share the employment surplus does not
contradict the wage increase at the bottom of the wage distribution, as observed during
the job polarization process. While manual workers’ wages increase, they do so to a lesser
extent than the marginal returns for service firms. For countries in Nordic Europe, Figure
10 shows that this optimistic scenario is fragile and can disappear if social programmes
become more generous (UB not indexed and increasing). In this case, the profitability
of bridge jobs can fall to zero, thereby halting labour reallocations. Hence, employment
losses in the routine labour market cannot be compensated for by employment gains in
the service sector if these labour markets remain segmented. If, until the mid-1990s, these
policies would have been applied in these countries, they would have reduced the size of
social programmes from the end of the 1990s. This finding can also explain why they
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enjoyed better labour market outcomes in the mid-2000s.
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Figure 11: Aggregate employment rate in Continental Europe.
As shown in Figure 11, countries in Continental Europe with a rising MW can actually
lose employment after technological changes. The economy falls into the trap of a seg-
mented labour market, thereby generating employment losses. Such countries can benefit
from structural changes by implementing a constant MW. Nevertheless, adjustments will
be persistent: it takes 200 quarters (50 years) for the economy to converge to its final
steady state. Under the existence of an MW, there is an employment decline due to the
discrepancy between the disappearance of routine jobs and creation of new manual jobs.
After this first regime, the rise in the employment rate is gradual, slowed by an MW that
discourages job creation in manual tasks. This finding contrasts with economies where
wage flexibility is not restricted by an MW as in the United States and Nordic Europe:
after 50 quarters, all adjustments are completed. The Pissarides model allows us to mea-
sure the duration of this transitional effect in this type of economy. Finally, concerning
the stylized facts on job polarization, the gradual decline in routine occupations implies
that the share of service in total employment (we restrict our analysis to the employment
of unskilled workers) increases more slowly than in the United States.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the basic Pissarides (1990) model to account for unbalanced dy-
namics across two sectors. By explicitly modelling job creation and wage bargaining in in-
teraction with LMIs, this model is able to explain sluggish employment adjustments. Our
model extension introduces an occupational choice for unemployed workers who search in
the market where this is the most profitable. After an occupational change, we take into
account the learning costs of the new occupation. As suggested by Acemoglu & Autor
(2011), we use this framework to examine the job polarization process. More precisely,
we aim to explain a puzzling conundrum: why does job polarization create jobs in the
United States, whereas it destroys them in Europe? Our diagnostic is relatively simple:
with a high MW/high UB, the creation of bridge jobs stalls and so does the reallocation
process from the routine labour market to manual jobs. Hence, by cutting this bridge
between these two labour markets, the MW/UB deprives the economy of a large part of
its workforce, which are condemned to permanent rest unemployment. In this context,
dismissal costs slow the decline in employment, whereas UB sustain this equilibrium with
a trap. Although this paper illustrated some basic economic mechanisms, a more ambi-
tious project might aim to introduce general equilibrium adjustments to capture the link
between the dynamics of relative marginal returns across tasks as well as the interactions
between skilled (abstract tasks) and unskilled labour. Finally, some empirical counter-
parts of the model must be identified, for different countries, to test the robustness of the
arguments presented in this paper. Albertini et al. (2015) is a first step on this path.
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A Derivation of wages
A.1 Routine jobs
The first order conditions are given by
ξJr(η, t) = (1− ξ)(Wr(η, t)− Um(η, t)) (32)
which, after replacing the value functions, gives:
• Um(η, t) = Ur(η, t)
ξyr(t)η − wr(η, t) + β(1− s)Jr(η, t+ 1) = (1− ξ)
{
wr(η, t)− br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)Wr(η, t+ 1) + sUr(η, t+ 1)− fr(η, t)Wr(η, t+ 1)− (1− fr(η, t))Ur(η, t+ 1)
]}
• Um(η, t) = U0s (η, t)
ξyr(t)η − wr(η, t) + β(1− s)Jr(η, t+ 1) = (1− ξ)
{
wr(η, t)− br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)Wr(η, t+ 1) + sU0s (η, t+ 1)− f 0s (η, t)W 0s (η, t+ 1)− (1− f 0s (η, t))U0s (η, t+ 1)
]}
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After some rearrangement, we have
• Um(η, t) = Ur(η, t)
wr(η, t) = ξyr(t)η + (1− ξ)br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)
(
ξJr(η, t+ 1)− (1− ξ)(Wr(η, t+ 1)− Ur(η, t+ 1))
)
+(1− ξ)fr(η, t)(Wr(η, t+ 1)− Ur(η, t+ 1))
]
• Um(η, t) = U0s (η, t)
wr(η, t) = ξyr(t)η + (1− ξ)br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)
(
ξJr(η, t+ 1)− (1− ξ)(Wr(η, t+ 1)− U0s (η, t+ 1))
)
+(1− ξ)f 0s (η, t)(W 0s (η, t+ 1)− U0s (η, t+ 1))
]
By using the job creation condition and κ/qr(η, t) = βJr(η, t+ 1) as well as the first order
condition resulting from the Nash sharing rule:
• Um(η, t) = Ur(η, t)
(1− ξ)(Wr(η, t+ 1)− Ur(η, t+ 1)) = ξJr(η, t+ 1) = ξ κ
qr(η, t)
• Um(η, t) = U0s (η, t)
(1− ξ)(W 0s (η, t+ 1)− U0s (η, t+ 1)) = ξJ0s (η, t+ 1) = ξ
κ
q0s(η, t)
we obtain the following wage equation
• Um(η, t) = Ur(η, t)
wr(η, t) = ξ(yr(t)η + κθr(η, t)) + (1− ξ)br(η, t)
• Um(η, t) = U0s (η, t)
wr(η, t) = ξ(yr(t)η + κθ
0
s(η, t)) + (1− ξ)br(η, t)
A.2 Service new (movers)
The first order conditions are given by
ξJ0s (η, t) = (1− ξ)(W 0s (η, t)− U0s (η, t)) (33)
38
which, after replacing the value functions, gives:
ξys(t)− w0s(η, t) + β(1− s)Js(t+ 1) = (1− ξ)
{
w0s(η, t)− br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)Ws(t+ 1) + sUs(t+ 1)− f 0s (η, t)W 0s (η, t+ 1)− (1− f 0s (η, t))U0s (η, t+ 1)
]}
After some rearrangement, we have
w0s(η, t) = ξys(t) + (1− ξ)br(η, t)
+β
[
(1− s)
(
ξJs(t+ 1)− (1− ξ)(Ws(t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1))
)
+(1− ξ)
(
f 0s (η, t)(W
0
s (η, t+ 1)− U0s (η, t+ 1)) + U0s (η, t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1)
)]
By using the job creation condition and κ/q0s(η, t) = βJ0s (η, t+1) as well as the first order
condition resulting from the Nash sharing rule:
(1− ξ)(W 0s (η, t+ 1)− U0s (η, t+ 1)) = ξJ0s (η, t+ 1) = ξ
κ
q0s(η, t)
we obtain the following wage equation
w0s(η, t) = ξ(ys(t) + κθ
0
s(η, t) + (1− ξ)
(
br(η, t) + β(U
0
s (η, t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1))
)
A.3 Service
The first order conditions are given by
ξJs(t) = (1− ξ)(Ws(t)− Us(t)) (34)
which, after replacing the value functions, gives:
ξys(t)− ws(t) + β(1− s)Js(t+ 1) = (1− ξ)
{
ws(t)− bs(t)
+β
[
(1− s)Ws(t+ 1) + sUs(t+ 1)− fs(t)Ws(t+ 1)− (1− fs(t))Us(t+ 1)
]}
After some rearrangement, we have
ws(t) = ξys(t) + (1− ξ)bs(t)
+β
[
(1− s)
(
ξJs(t+ 1)− (1− ξ)(Ws(t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1))
)
+(1− ξ)fs(t)(Ws(t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1))
]
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By using the job creation condition and κ/qs(t) = βJs(t + 1) as well as the first order
condition resulting from the Nash sharing rule:
(1− ξ)(Ws(t+ 1)− Us(t+ 1)) = ξJs(t+ 1) = ξ κ
qs(t)
we obtain the following wage equation
ws(t) = ξ(ys(t) + κθs(t)) + (1− ξ)bs(t)
B Algorithm
Let us denote by θ the vector of labour market tightness and by N the vector of employ-
ment stocks. Thus, the whole system can be written in a block-recursive way:
θt = Fθ(θt+1, yt+1) (35)
Nt+1 = FN(Nt, θt) (36)
By using the block-recursive system, one can solve this problem as follows:
1. We consider a sequence of exogenous variables {yt}Tt=1.
2. For a terminal condition θT we obtain by backward iteration the values for θT−1,θT−2,...,θ0
using Equation (35).
3. On each date T−1, T−2, ...0 we check for the binding MW, the occupational choice,
and the quitting and scrapping of all sectors.
4. With this vector {θt}Tt=0, we deduce, by using FN in Equation (36), the vector
{Nt}Tt=0, given an initial condition N0.
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